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BROWN TO PAYTON

TO

HARRIS: A FOURTH AMENDMENT DOUBLE

PLAY BY THE SUPREME COURT

I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 11, 1984, Thelma Staton was murdered in New
York City.1 Police officers immediately began an investigation,
and over the course of several days gradually developed probable
cause to arrest Bernard Harris for the murder.2 There is no question that police officers could have arrested Harris had they encountered him in public.3 However, if the police wished to enter
Harris' residence without his consent to make the arrest, they were
required by law to first obtain an arrest warrant from a neutral
judge.4
The police officers decided to arrest Harris in his home, but
did not want to obtain the necessary warrant. Time was not an
issue: the arresting officers were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing
suspect; they were instead arresting a suspect in his home for a
five-day-old murder.5 Nor could the officers have reasonably

1. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 15 (1990).
2. See id. at 15-17 (reciting pertinent facts from lower court decisions). This note
focuses on Bernard Harris' murder conviction case as it was litigated in four different
courts on five separate occasions. The trial court case is unreported; the other cases are:
People v. Harris, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) [hereinafter Harris I] (affirming trial court conviction); People v. Harris, 532 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter
Harris II] (reversing Appellate Division); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) [hereinafter Harris III] (reversing Court of Appeals); People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y.
1991) [hereinafter Harris IV] (reinstating previous Court of Appeals decision on state
constitutional grounds).
3. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (allowing warrantless arrests in public based on probable cause).
4. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (requiring arrest warrants
for routine in-home felony arrests). Payton is discussed in detail infra at notes 56-70 and
accompanying text.
5. Harris 11, 532 N.E.2d at 1230.
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feared that their warrant request would be denied, as the showing
of probable cause was very strong.6 The problem was New York's
unique right-to-counsel rules. If the police officers wished to interrogate Harris without an attorney present, their chances of doing so
would be much greater if they did not obtain an arrest warrant.
In New York, a criminal suspect's right to counsel attaches at7
the moment accusatory papers seeking an arrest warrant are filed.
Once this happens, the suspect is guaranteed one meeting with an
attorney. Even if the suspect wishes to speak to police without the
benefit of counsel, any statements made by the suspect are inadmissible until after the suspect has met with and been fully apprised of his rights by an attorney.8 On the other hand, if accusatory papers seeking a warrant are not filed, the right of counsel
does not attach until the suspect is formally indicted.9 Until the
indictment is issued, police officers need only advise the suspect of
0 rights. The right to counsel
his or her Miranda"
then attaches
only upon request after the indictment has been issued."
Therefore, even though the United States Supreme Court had
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require warrants for in-home
arrests, the standard procedure in New York City in 1984 was to
violate the law by making such arrests without first obtaining warrants.12 Accordingly, police officers bypassed the courthouse on
their way to Bernard Harris' apartment. At the apartment, officers
stationed themselves at the door and at the window by the fire
escape, drew their weapons, and banged on both the door and
window until Harris came to the door. Once inside, the arresting
officers recited the Miranda warnings, and Harris calmly confessed
to the murder while sipping a glass of wine. The officers
handcuffed Harris and drove him to the police station, where he
was advised of his Miranda rights a second time. He then repeated
3
the confession and signed a statement to that effect.
6. See Harris I, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (Asch, J., concurring) (detailing the unquestioned existence of probable cause to believe that Harris had murdered Thelma Staton).
7. See LEwis R. KATZ AND JAY SHAPIRO, NEW YORK SUPPRESSION MANUAL § 21.06
n.3 (1991) [hereinafter NYSM] (citing People v. Lane, 478 N.E.2d 1305 (N.Y. 1985)).
8. See id. at n.5 (citing People v. Smith, 465 N.E.2d 336 (N.Y. 1984)).
9. See id. at n.17 (citing People v. Simpson, 508 N.Y.S.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986)).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). Under Miranda, police need
only advise a suspect in custody of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.
11. See NYSM, supra note 7, § 21.06 n.11 (citing N.Y. CODE CRIM PROC. § 1.20).
12. Harris III, 495 U.S. 14, 26 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 16 (reciting the pertinent facts from the lower court decisions). Actually,
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When Harris was tried for murder, the in-home confession was
suppressed. 4 The trial court found that police acted illegally by
making a forcible non-emergency entry into the home without a
warrant' 5 in direct violation of Payton v. New York. 6 The court
admitted the second confession into evidence, finding that the
second confession was sufficiently removed from the illegal arrest
so that the two events were unrelated. 7 At trial, Harris was convicted of murder, and he appealed.' 8
The deceptively simple case of People v. Harris provoked
dramatic disagreement among twenty-one reviewing judges sitting
on three different courts. All courts let stand (with varying degrees
of enthusiasm) the trial court's decision to suppress the first confession as the direct result of an illegal arrest. 9 The courts sharply split, however, over the appropriate treatment of the second
confession. The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division)
affirmed the admission of the second statement in a 2-2-1 plurality.F0 The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding 4-1-2 that
the second statement was legally indistinguishable from the first
and must be suppressed.2 ' The United States Supreme Court in
turn reversed, holding 5-4 the second confession admissible in spite
of an earlier Payton violation because it was obtained outside the
home and because the arrest was supported by probable cause.'
Finally, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the New York
Court of Appeals again suppressed the second confession (again

Harris gave a third statement at the station house. At the prosecutor's request, Harris
made a videotaped confession, which was done after he had already requested that he be
allowed to consult with an attorney. For reasons unrelated to the subject of this note, that
statement was excluded from use at trial and its suppression was not challenged on ap-

peal. Id.
14. Harris II, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (N.Y. 1988).
15. Id.
16. 443 U.S. 573 (1980).
17. Harris I, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Asch, J., concurring).
18. Harris 11, 532 N.E.2d at 1231; see also infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the trial court decision.
19. See Harris III, 495 U.S. 14, 16 (1990) (noting that the state court did not challenge the ruling to suppress the first confession); Harris II, 532 N.E.2d at 1235 (noting
that Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) requires that confessions resulting from illegal
arrests be suppressed); Harris 1, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 823-825 (stating that two justices would
not have suppressed the first confession because they believed there was no unlawful
entry where the defendant voluntarily admitted the police officers into his apartment).
20. Harris 1, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
21. Harris 11, 532 N.E.2d at 1235.
22. Harris 111, 495 U.S. at 20.

256

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.43:251

voting 4-1-2), citing the special need to protect the warrant requirement in light of New York's unique right-to-counsel rules.23
It perhaps is not surprising that a Fourth Amendment case
contemplating suppression of a reliable murder confession would
result in eleven separate appellate opinions. Controversial topics
such as the home arrest warrant requirement and the proper operation of the exclusionary rule often have been decided and applied
by closely divided courts.2' The Harris decisions, however, go far
beyond a good-faith disagreement over difficult Fourth Amendment
issues. They reflect a judicial willingness to covertly abandon wellestablished doctrines such as the warrant requirement and the
exclusionary rule in a manner that substitutes ideology and "analytical sleight of hand" 25 for stare decisis and honest debate.
This note analyzes the damage done by the Harris decisions
to Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Part II reviews the importance of the warrant requirement,
and examines the need to deter warrantless entries such as the one
which occurred in Harris. Part I explains the use of the
exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations, emphasizing
how the attenuation doctrine balances Fourth Amendment
protections against society's interest in convicting dangerous criminals. Part IV examines all of the Harris opinions in detail, and
demonstrates that important Fourth Amendment doctrines were
damaged by the problematic Harris II decision. Finally, Part V
approvingly cites two examples of courts looking to state constitutions to maintain Fourth Amendment protections in the wake of
Harris.
II.

THE

ILLEGALITY OF HARRIS' ARREST

Police acted illegally when they arrested Harris because they
entered his residence with neither a warrant nor with Harris' con-

23. Harris IV, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (N.Y. 1991).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1976) (splitting 2-1 over amount of deference to pay to magistrate's probable cause determination),
cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); People v. King, 487 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1971)
(affirming defendant's conviction 4-3 over the objection of dissenters who complained that
the police officer did not arrest on the basis of the probable cause relied on to obtain a
warrant, but instead used the warrant to gain access to defendant's apartment in order to
search for drugs); Edward v. State, 808 P.2d 528, 531 (Nev. 1991) (reversing appellant's
conviction a 3-2 after determining that evidence admitted at trial was obtained during an
illegal arrest and, therefore, must be suppressed).
25. Harris 11,495 U.S. at 21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sent 6 As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand exactly why this conduct is considered illegal and why it should be
deterred.
A.

The History of the Warrant Requirement

It has been suggested that the lack of a meaningful warrant
requirement in colonial America was directly responsible for the
American Revolution and the founding of this country. 7 The colonists were subjected to limitless intrusions into their privacy
through the much-hated British device known as the Writ of Assistance. A Writ of Assistance allowed customs officials to break
down any door and search any place for evidence of customs violations. The officials were not required to have particularized suspicions about any person or place before searching, nor were they required to justify their actions to any authority after the search. The
Writ of Assistance effectively gave the government the power to
conduct warrantless searches and seizures. 28
To the people who founded this country, such unchecked
governmental power was unacceptable. Colonist James Otis delivered a speech in 1761 to his fellow citizens in which he decried
the Writ of Assistance as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book."2 9 According to Otis, limitless government power to search and seize
placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."' 30 John Adams, the second President of the United States,
later recalled the atmosphere at Otis' speech, stating, "[Tihen and
there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born."

31

Whatever the role played by the Writ of Assistance in the
American Revolution, there can be no doubt that memories of ar-

26. Id. at 17.
27. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting memoirs of
John Adams concerning the role of warrantless intrusions in the founding of the Nation).
28. See LEWIS R. KATZ, OHIO ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter OASS] (generally describing the Writ of Assistance and its deleterious effects on
liberty and privacy in colonial America).
29. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625 (quoting Otis as recounted by James Adams) (internal quotation, footnote and citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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bitrary government conduct were considered by the framers of the
Fourth Amendment. 32 The Fourth Amendment 33 eliminated the
general warrant feature of the Writ of Assistance by requiring that
all warrants be supported by probable cause and limited in
scope.' Just as important, the Fourth Amendment declared the
right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures".
Courts have long interpreted the reasonableness clause to require
that probable cause be determined by an impartial judge or magistrate before the search or seizure takes place.36
B. The Importance of the Warrant Requirement
When the New York City police officers decided to go directly to Bernard Harris' apartment without first seeking a warrant,
they abandoned several important safeguards contemplated by the
framers of the Fourth Amendment. Most obviously, they unilaterally usurped the judicial branch's authority to determine probable
cause, in direct contradiction of the concept of separation of powers. 37 In Harris' case, the determination of probable cause was not

32. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (refusing
to apply Fourth Amendment to an extraterritorial arrest, but acknowledging that the
amendment was intended to protect citizens against arbitrary government conduct).
33. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (holding that the
likely existence of probable cause to search a hotel room for narcotics did not justify
police failure to first seek from a neutral judicial officer a warrant to search); United
States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1282 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is the function of a
neutral judicial officer, not a police officer, to draw the reasonable inference necessary to
support searching a home); State v. Schur, 538 P.2d 689, 692 (Kan. 1975) (holding that a
warrantless search could not be supported by a police officer's observation that marijuana
was being smoked inside the house because such an entry must be predicated on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate).
37. See OASS, supra note 28, at 76-77 (listing separation of powers as one of the primary rationales for the warrant requirement). Virtually all power granted in this country
by the people to a branch of government is checked and balanced by power granted to a
different branch of government. This delicate system of checks and balances is upset
when one branch usurps power for itself, as when police officers exclude the judicial
branch from probable cause determinations.
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made, as required, by a "neutral and detached magistrate,"38 but
instead "by [police officers] engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."3 9 Courts have consistently stated
that the dual requirements of probable cause and particularity in a
warrant are of little use if these determinations are made by the
very people seeking and executing the warrants. 4° The U.S. Supreme Court echoed James Otis' warning about placing "the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer" 41 when it held
that a warrantless search of a hotel room for narcotics, although
supported by probable cause, was illegal. To hold otherwise, the
Court reasoned, "would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers."

Most importantly, the warrant requirement recognizes that
unreasonable searches and seizures must be prevented because their
effects cannot be undone. An innocent person who has been
wrongfully arrested does not simply forget about the incident once
released from custody.43 Innocent family members forced to lie
face-down on the floor in handcuffs while police search through
their most personal possessions are not consoled when the erring
police department apologizes and offers to pay for the broken front
door. Even if police officers are disciplined for such actions (and
they rarely are), or even if the innocent citizens can seek money
damages through the courts (and they are rarely successful), the
damage caused by an unreasonable search and seizure is not cured
38. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 453, 464 (1932) ("the informed and
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches
and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried
action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests"); McKnight v. United
States, 183 F.2d 977, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (suppressing evidence seized because police
officers deliberately failed to arrest defendant on the street in order to arrest him in his
home for the real purpose of searching the premises); Harding v. Florida, 301 So. 2d
513, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that evidence of marijuana must be
suppressed because marijuana was seized when police officers entered defendant's home,
looking for drugs, but on the pretext of arresting another man with a traffic warrant),
cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1975).
41. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (internal quotation, footnote and
citation omitted).
42. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (commenting that where police officers have wrongfully arrested a person, "no decision that he should go free can come quickly enough to erase the invasion of his privacy
that already will have occurred").

260

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[3/ol.43:251

by an after-the-fact remedy." A casual reading of the text of the
Fourth Amendment indicates that the framers were not content to
merely outlaw unreasonable searches and seizures. They were determined to prevent such conduct by giving effect to the warrant
requirement. This emphasis on prevention has been the under-pinning of judicial declarations that warrantless searches are "per se
unreasonable. 4 5 When the arresting officers in Harris abandoned
the warrant procedure, they abandoned one of the fundamental
distinctions between the new United States and the old system of
colonial oppresion.
C.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

The Fourth Amendment was intended to protect citizens from
arbitrary government conduct, but it was not intended to hamper
police in the execution of their legitimate law enforcement duties.
To achieve these dual goals, courts have long recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement where exigent circumstances preclude police from seeking a warrant before a search or47 seizure,4 6
or where an individual consents to the search or seizure.
The Supreme Court currently recognizes three situations where
exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search or seizure: imminent escape of the suspect, imminent destruction of evidence, and
imminent danger of harm to another person.48 Officers need not
have absolute proof of 'exigent circumstances before acting without
a warrant. The law only requires that police officers use common
sense and act reasonably. 49 Recognizing that exigent circumstances

44. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadequacy of
civil remedies and internal disciplinary proceedings in response to unreasonable searches
and seizures.
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Katz held that police acted illegally when they eavesdropped on defendant's conversations in a phone booth without first
seeking a warrant, even though the activity was amply supported by probable cause and
was limited in scope. Id at 359. See also California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991
(1991) (quoting same language from Katz).
46. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (acknowledging that
exigent circumstances are relevant when considering the legality of a warrantless arrest).
Payton is discussed in detail infra at notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
47. The trial court suppressed the first confession, holding that Harris did not voluntarily consent to police entry into his apartment, and this conclusion was not disturbed on
appeal. Harris IV, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1052 n.1 (N.Y. 1991).
48. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
49. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (stating that the reasonableness of an officer's belief in the existence of exigent circumstances is the standard
by which to judge his or her actions).
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also demand that police officers make split-second decisions, sometimes in life-threatening situations, courts are understandably reluctant to second-guess the good faith assessments of exigent circumstances made by these officers."
However, no exigent circumstances existed in the warrantless
arrest of Harris." Officers did not arrive at Harris' apartment in
hot pursuit in the hours immediately following the killing. Instead,
they had been working for several days to identify a suspect and
develop probable cause. 2 There was no reason for the arresting
officers to believe that Harris knew he was under suspicion or that
he might flee. Nor was there any suggestion that Harris was attempting to destroy evidence or that he posed an immediate threat
to others.
D. Payton and the Preservation of the Warrant Requirement for
Arrests in the Home
In 1976, the Supreme Court seemingly created another exception to the warrant requirement. In United States v. Watson, 3 the
Court held that arrests made in public do not require prior authorization through the warrant process as long as probable cause
exists.' By removing all public arrests from prior judicial review,
the Court arguably created an inference that arrests were somehow
different from other types of searches and seizures. The Court
expressly left open the question of whether arrests in the home
might also fall under the so-called "arrest exception" to the warrant
requirement.5 5 Four years later, however, the Court drew a line at
the door of a person's home. In Payton v. New York 56 the Court
held that in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, police

50. See, e.g., id. (stating that the reasonableness of a police officer's assessment of
exigent circumstances must be judged considering the degree of danger involved); United
States v. Perdomo, 800 F:2d 916, 919 (1985) (stating that a police officer's reasonable
belief that exigent circumstances existed must be judged taking into consideration the
officer's lack of delay in making a warrantless entry); People v. Cocchizra, 221 N.Y.S.2d
856, 862 (1961) (finding that where the defendant could have used his gun or disposed
of his narcotics, the police officers were entitled to a good faith assessment of exigent
circumstances).
51. Harris 11I, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Harris 11, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 1229 n.15 (N.Y. 1988).
53. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 418 n.6.
56. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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must have a warrant before entering a home to make an arrest.57
Payton involved two cases, one of which was factually similar
to Harris.In the main case, officers investigated a murder over the
course of two days and developed probable cause to arrest Theodore Payton for the crime.5" Without obtaining a warrant, six officers went to Payton's apartment and, when there was no answer,
broke down the door.59 Although Payton was not inside, the police officers seized a .30-caliber shell casing that was used at
Payton's trial." In the companion case decided by the Court in
the Payton decision, police officers developed probable cause to
arrest Obie Riddick for armed robbery. 6' When the officers arrived at Riddick's apartment without a warrant, Riddick's young
son opened the door.62 Officers saw Riddick sitting inside the
apartment and- entered to make the arrest.63 Before allowing
Riddick to get dressed, the officers searched a chest of drawers and
discovered weapons and narcotics. 6
The state courts held in both cases that the evidence was
admissible because the state statute permitted warrantless entries
into the home to arrest.65 The state courts drew a distinction between a warrantless entry to search and a warrantless entry to
arrest, concluding that the latter did not constitute as severe an
invasion of privacy as the former. According to these courts, a
warrantless entry to search was more invasive because a search
could range throughout the entire house, allowing police to rummage through all sorts of personal effects without any limitation in
scope imposed by the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. A
warrantless entry to arrest was much less intrusive because police
officers would be limited to searching those areas large enough to
hold a person, and would have to terminate the search when the
person was found. Therefore, according to the state courts, a warrantless entry to arrest did not violate Fourth Amendment reason-

57. Id. at 602-03.
58. Id. at 576.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 576-77.
61. See id. at 578 (noting that defendant Riddick had been identified by the victims of
the armed robbery, implying the existence of probable cause).
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 579.
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ableness standards.'
The U.S. Supreme Court, in suppressing the evidence seized
in both cases, rejected the distinction between a warrantless entry
to make an arrest and a warrantless entry to search.67 The Court
first took notice that an arrest is a seizure of the person and is
thus regulated by the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.68 The Court then noted that
home arrests required even more constitutional scrutiny:
To be arrested in the home involves not only the
invasion attendant in all arrests but also an invasion of the
sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an
invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence
of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished
under statutory
authority and when probable cause is clear69
ly present.
The Court thus returned to the familiar historical concepts of
security in the home and person in reaching its Payton holding.
Where Watson suggested that arrests and searches required entirely
different Fourth Amendment analyses, Payton re-emphasized that
both types of invasion are subject to the reasonableness command
of the Fourth Amendment. After Payton, there could be no doubt
about the legality of a warrantless entry to make an arrest. The
Court stated that "[i]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn
a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
70
warrant.,
E.

The Two Crimes Committed in Harris

The police in Harris were investigating a serious crime and
were obliged to arrest the perpetrator. The law gave the police
officers all the options they needed to accomplish this duty. The
showing of probable cause to arrest Harris was strong, and there is
little doubt that a warrant would have been issued quickly and

66. Id. at 579-81.
67. Id. at 585-86.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 588-89 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied sub nom. Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978)).
70. Id. at 590.
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easily had the officers sought one.71 If they were worried that
Harris might flee from his apartment, they certainly could have put
the apartment under surveillance while a warrant was obtained. If
Harris tried to escape or if some other exigent circumstance arose,
they could have arrested him on the spot, with or without a warrant.' Nothing in the law would have prevented police officers
from arresting Harris quickly and safely under such circumstances.
But instead, the police broke the law. They knew that filing
the accusatory papers requesting a warrant would give Harris a
greater right to counsel than he would otherwise enjoy, and they
did not wish to be so encumbered in their investigation.73 The
arresting qfficers, therefore, ignored the Fourth Amendment and the
command of Payton. They entered Harris' apartment without his
consent and without a warrant to make an arrest. In so doing, a
message was sent, not only to Bernard Harris (who, admittedly,
does not generate much sympathy), but also to society. The message was that the New York Police Department did not see a problem with traditions underlying the British Writ of Assistance and
unchecked governmental power to search and seize. The police
officers were unconcerned that they were conducting, without prior
review, the most invasive type of search and seizure possible: entry
into a private home for the purpose of depriving a person of his
liberty. They were not bothered by the fact that unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be remedied, and that citizens are
secure only when unreasonable invasions are prevented. Ordinary
citizens are not permitted to pick and choose which laws to follow
and which may be ignored, but that is precisely what the arresting
officers did here. Although the Harris trial properly focused on the
crimes committed by Bernard Harris, the crimes committed by the
police required attention as well. Some of the courts reviewing

71. In the days following the murder, the victim's daughter told the investigating officers that Harris had kidnapped and raped her mother, eventually releasing her several days
before the murder. The victim's co-workers said that the victim told them the same story,
and an entry in her diary recorded the incident. The victim's boyfriend told police officers
that the victim complained about the kidnapping and rape, but would not reveal her
assailant's name for fear of putting her boyfriend in danger. Harris 1, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823,
824 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Aseh, J., concurring).
72. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text for discussion of exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
73. See Harris 1, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the
desire to evade New York's unique right-to-counsel rules was the true motivation behind
police disregard of the warrant requirement).
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Harris were prepared to deal with both sets of crimes, but others
were not.74
Ill.

CONFRONTING FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

When the police abandon the mechanism for preventing Fourth
Amendment violations, courts have few after-the-fact remedies
available to redress the violation. Civil sanctions are usually unavailable or inadequate to remedy constitutional violations such as
those committed by the police in Harris. Actions for trespass are
usually limited to compensatory damages, such as reimbursement
for property damaged during an unlawful search.7 5 Punitive damages are available only if the plaintiff can show actual malice on
the part of the government.7 6 Because the potential for monetary
recovery is so limited, most citizens subjected to an unlawful
search or seizure do not bother to bring a civil action, and few
attorneys are interested in taking such cases on a contingency
basis.'
In addition to civil actions, there is also the possibility of prosecuting the offending police officers, either formally through the
criminal justice system or less formally through police department
disciplinary proceedings. 78 At least one Supreme Court justice,
however, does not have much faith in this remedy: "Self-scrutiny is
a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a
District Attorney to prosecute himself or his associates [such as
police officers] for well-meaning violations of the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates

74. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
75. See Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 979 (1983) (comparing
victims of illegal searches and seizures to victims of tortious conduct).
76. See Leslie E. John, Formulating Standardsfor Awards of Punitive Damages in the
Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REv. 2033, 2055 (1986) (distinguishing between the bases on which punitive and compensatory damages may be claimed).
77. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) (noting the inadequacy of
civil actions to remedy unreasonable searches and seizures); see also Potter Stewart, Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1387-88 (1983) (explaining
that while damage actions for Fourth Amendment violations may provide some compensation to victims, they are not sufficient on their own and have several problems including
the lack of competent legal counsel to pursue such civil remedies).
78. See Report to the Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, Truth in Criminal Justice, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573, 579 (1989)
(highlighting internal disciplinary measures as one of the administrative tools which can
be employed to redress Fourth Amendment violations).
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have ordered."79 Internal departmental proceedings are similarly
not likely or helpful. Indeed, the arresting officers in Harris would
not have been subject to internal discipline because they followed
standard departmental procedure when they went to Harris' home
without a warrant.80
A.

The Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is the primary sanction currently used to
enforce the reasonableness mandate of the Fourth Amendment."1
Under this doctrine, evidence seized as the result of a constitutional
violation is excluded from use at a criminal trial.
Historically, there were two policy justifications for the
exclusionary rule. First, the doctrine was used to prevent the courts
from approving and perpetuating illegal conduct by officials in
other branches of the government. Under this view, the public's
confidence in the integrity of the judicial branch would be undermined if courts allowed constitutionally tainted evidence into the
courtroom. 8 2
The second justification for the exclusionary rule was deterrence of illegal police activity. The rule assumed that police officers are ultimately interested in securing convictions of criminals
and are thus deterred from violating the Constitution if they know
that evidence obtained illegally will not help secure a convic83
tion.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court took a dramatically
different view of the "judicial integrity" justification for the
exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon,s4 the Court held that
evidence was admissible where it was seized by police officers
acting in good faith reliance on a warrant later found to be inval-

79. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled in

part by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
80. Harris I, 495 U.S. 14, 25 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (adopting exclusionary rule
for federal courts); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (applying exclusionary rule to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause).
82. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (suggesting that the importance of the judicial
branch's role in securing Fourth Amendment rights implies that the public's faith in the
judiciary is undermined when courts fail to prevent public officials from tampering with
these rights).
83. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975) (citing deterrence as a primary function of the exclusionary rule). Brown is discussed in detail infra at notes 96-124
and accompanying text.
84. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

I99]

FOURTH AMENDMENT DOUBLE PLAY

267

id.' The Court noted that the exclusion of such evidence would
not deter officers from violating constitutional provisions because
they are doing as much as can be expected when acting in good
faith reliance on a warrant.8 6 As for judicial integrity, the Court
reasoned that public respect for the courts was endangered not by
use of constitutionally tainted evidence (as suggested in Weeks), 7
but rather by exclusion of "inherently trustworthy" evidence. 8
Therefore, the Court limited application of the exclusionary rule to
those situations where it clearly would deter future illegal police
behavior. 9
Leon not only manifested the current Supreme Court majority's
dislike of the exclusionary rule, but also its reluctance to openly
and honestly overrule earlier decisions giving birth to the rule. By
purportedly leaving the exclusionary rule undisturbed in cases
where the rule would serve a clear deterrent purpose, the Court
could plausibly claim that it was merely balancing the societal
costs and benefits of the rule. The succeeding sections of this note,
however, suggest a different, more insidious agenda by the Court.
In Harris, the Court confronted an admittedly confusing aspect of
the exclusionary rule - its proper application to a confession
given in the wake of an illegal arrest. When the Court was finished, the exclusionary rule was removed from meaningful application to a situation where the police misconduct was egregious and
the deterrent effect of the rule was clear.
B. Deterring Illegal Arrests: the Exclusionary Rule and the
Attenuation Doctrine
Because both unreasonable searches and seizures violate the
Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule should be used to deter
either type of constitutional violation. In practice, however, the
exclusionary rule is not applied equally. Following an illegal search
the operation of the exclusionary rule is quite simple. All evidence
obtained during the illegal search is banned from use at trial. 9

85. Id. at 922.
86. Id. at 918.
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
89. Id. at 926 ("suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or
recidess in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an' objectively reasonable
belief in the existence of probable cause").
90. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (reversing lower court convictions based on admission of the evidence discovered during illegal search).
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The-rule does not apply as neatly, though, to illegal arrests. An illegally arrested person is not "excluded" from trial. Rather, the
court retains jurisdiction no matter how unreasonable the arrest.9'
Similarly, a person may not use an illegal arrest as the basis for
overturning a conviction.'
Therefore, the exclusionary rule seeks to deter illegal arrests by
excluding evidence seized as the result of an illegal arrest. In
Payton, for example, the weapons and narcotics discovered during
the illegal arrest of Obie Riddick were suppressed.93 It was fairly
easy to conclude that these items of tangible evidence were seized
as the result of the illegal arrest.
In Harris, however, police seized no tangible evidence as the
result of the illegal arrest. The only evidence they "seized" was
Harris' confessions, and it was not clear if the confessions were
obtained as the result of the illegal arrest. Indeed, the workings of
the human mind are too complex to ascertain whether a suspect
gives a confession as the result of an illegal arrest, inspite of an
illegal arrest, or without regard to an illegal arrest?' The cause
and effect relationship between the arrest and the confessions in
Harris was further clouded by the administration of Miranda warnings in Harris' apartment. Any coercive atmosphere created by an
illegal arrest was arguably lessened by informing Harris that he had
the right to remain silent and the right to speak with an attorney

91. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (rejecting appellant's due process
argument because he understood the charges against him and received a fair trial, stating
that "there is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person
rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will");
see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (1992) (concluding that
even though the abduction of a foreign defendant into U.S. police custody may be shocking, the defendant is nonetheless answerable for his offense in court). The disparate application of the exclusionary rule to illegal searches and arrests is probably best explained
by the exclusionary rule's cost to society. Society's interest in convicting a dangerous
criminal does not evaporate simply because the defendant was subjected to an illegal
search or seizure. If illegally seized tangible evidence is suppressed, the possibility remains that other untainted evidence can be used to secure a conviction. On the other
hand, obviously, a conviction is not possible where an illegal arrest deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the defendant. OASS, supra note 28, at 35-36.
92. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (reaffirming the rule established
by Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) that a conviction is not invalid despite an
illegal arrest or detention).
93. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payton.
94. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975) (stating the impossibility of objectively determining whether a confession is the product of free will or the result of exploitation by a law enforcement officer).
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before questioning.95 In fact, the record indicates that the atmosphere in the apartment was anything but coercive. Harris invited
the officers in, poured himself a glass of wine, and confessed to
the police officers.' Application of the exclusionary rule to
Harris' confessions was thus not nearly as straightforward as application of the rule to tangible evidence discovered in the course of
an illegal search or following an illegal arrest.
The Supreme Court clarified the function of the exclusionary
rule in the arrest/confession context in Wong Sun v. United
States97 and Brown v. Illinois." In Wong Sun, the defendant was
illegally arrested, but after arraignment was released on his own
recognizance." Several days later, the defendant voluntarily returned to the police station and made an inculpatory statement. 1' °
The Court admitted this confession -into evidence, finding it so
attenuated from the illegal arrest that its suppression would not
deter future illegal arrests.' In contrast, the defendant in Brown
gave an inculpatory statement while still in police custody only a
few hours after the illegal arrest.' 2 The Court suppressed the
statement in Brown because it was too closely related to the underlying illegality of the arrest. 3
Wong Sun and Brown provided workable rules that balanced
the need to deter Fourth Amendment violations with the legitimate
needs of law enforcement. Wong Sun rejected the notion that all
evidence, including confessions seized in the wake of an illegal
arrest must be suppressed; instead, the Court focused on whether
police tried to exploit the illegal arrest in order to obtain the confession." 4 The reasoning is sound: if police make an illegal arrest
with the purpose of obtaining a confession, subsequent suppression
of that confession would remove the incentive police had for making the illegal arrest in the first place.'0 5 Application of the
exclusionary rule would likely deter the illegal arrest. On the other

95. Harris 1, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Asch, J. concurring).

96. Id.
97. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
98. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
99. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 475.
100. Id. at 475-76.
101. Id. at 491.
102. Brown, 422 U.S. at 595-96.
103. Id. at 604-05.
104. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.
105. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (construing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963)). See also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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hand, if there is no apparent relationship between the illegal arrest
and the confession, then it can be safely assumed that the illegal
arrest was inadvertent or that police made the illegal arrest for
reasons other than obtaining a confession. In such a case, the
exclusionary rule probably would not accomplish its deterrent purpose."° If the goal of police in making the illegal arrest was not
to secure the confession, then suppressing the confession would be
unlikely to change police behavior in the future.
Wong Sun was clearly the latter type of case. Whatever reasons
police had for illegally arresting the defendant, they could not have
predicted that the defendant would voluntarily return several days
after his release from custody to confess. The illegal arrest still
required deterrence, but suppressing the fortuitous confession was
unlikely to deter. In other words, the confession was sufficiently
attenuated from the initial illegality that the confession was admis17
sible.
The Wong Sun attenuation rule functioned well until 1966,
when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Miranda v.
Arizona.10 8 In Miranda, the Court held that police may not interrogate a citizen before first advising the citizen of his or her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and right to counsel. 9 Compliance with Miranda obviously lessened the coercive
atmosphere surrounding police interrogation, but this phenomenon
had an unintended effect on the attenuation doctrine. Lower courts
began to rely solely on Miranda when reviewing the admissibility
of confessions, and some ceased to conduct the attenuation analysis
mandated by Wong Sun where the confession was obtained in the
wake of an illegal arrest.
One such case was Brown v. Illinois."' In that case the defendant, Richard Brown, confessed to a murder after having been
illegally arrested. Brown and Wong Sun were at opposite ends of
the attenuation spectrum: Chicago police admitted at trial that they
arrested Brown without a warrant solely because they wanted to

106. Cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978) (finding that the application of the exclusionary rule would not serve its deterrent purpose when a long lapse of
time occurs between the officer's illegal search for evidence and the testimony of a witness at the trial of the defendant).
107. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
108. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
109. Id. at 479.
110. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

1992]

FOURTH AMENDMENT DOUBLE PLAY

question him in connection with a murder."' Brown made his
confession while still in unlawful police custody. 1 2 There could
be no doubt that police exploited the illegal arrest with the goal of
obtaining a confession. The Illinois courts all acknowledged the
illegality of Brown's arrest, but they uniformly refused to suppress
the confession because there was no evidence that it was coerced."' Instead, the record showed that police administered
Miranda warnings three times before Brown gave his full confession. 14 Finding compliance with Miranda dispositive to the admissibility of Brown's confession, the state courts did not conduct
a Fourth Amendment attenuation analysis in order to determine
exclusionary rule would have served to deter the illewhether the
11 5
arrest
gal
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Illinois courts
and held that the administration of Miranda warnings did not dispose of the Fourth Amendment issues.116 The Court made it clear
that-although Miranda warnings protected Fifth Amendment interests, the warnings did nothing to deter the illegal arrest that
brought Brown into custody in the first place. Deterrence of the
illegal arrest, according to the Court, was accomplished through
application of the attenuation doctrine." 7
Brown clarified the attenuation analysis by identifying three
factors for courts to consider when evaluating the relationship
between an illegal arrest and a subsequent confession: "[tihe temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of
intervening circumstances,... and, particularly, the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct .... ", 8 Applying these
three factors, the Court quickly concluded that Brown's confession
was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest. Brown's
statements came only two hours after the illegal arrest, "and there
was no intervening event of significance whatsoever."".9 The
Court also found that the manner in which police conducted the
arrest gave "the appearance of having been calculated to cause

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

605.
595-96.
596-97.
594-95.
597.
601-02.
603-04 (citation omitted).
604.
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Court supsurprise, fright, and confusion." 120 Accordingly, the 12

pressed Brown's confession and reversed his conviction. 1
Wong Sun and Brown made powerful statements about Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. On one hand, the Court recognized that
illegal arrests are not always deterred by suppression of subsequent
confessions. The Court thus established rules for determining when
the relationship between the arrest and the confession warranted
application of the exclusionary rule. On the other hand, the Court
unmistakably manifested its determination to enforce the Fourth
Amendment, even to the point of unanimously suppressing a reliable murder confession, where suppression was likely to deter illegal police conduct.
There was, however, disagreement on the Brown court that is
of critical importance. In an innocent-sounding concurrence, Justice
Powell made it clear that he agreed only with the Court's conclusion that Miranda warnings do not per se protect Fourth Amendment interests in the arrest/confession context."2 When considering a new test to replace the old rules, Powell proposed classifying
Fourth Amendment violations according to seriousness. Brown
would be at the high end of this hierarchy because in that case,
police made an arrest without probable cause. At the low end of
the hierarchy would be mere "'technical' violations of Fourth
Amendment rights", such as where police search or seize in goodfaith reliance on a warrant later found to be invalid."n According
to Powell, only the former type of violation justified suppression of
the evidence in order to deter police conduct. 4 In Powell's
view, therefore, the "flagrancy" prong of the majority's three-part
test was the determinative factor in an attenuation analysis.
Justice Powell did not say in Brown where he ranked a warrantless in-home arrest on his scorecard of Fourth Amendment

120. Id. at 605.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 611-12.
124. Id. at 612. For "technical" violations, Justice Powell
would not require more than proof that effective Miranda warnings were given
and that the ensuing statement was voluntary in the Fifth Amendment sense.
Absent aggravating circumstances, [Justice Powell] would consider a statement
given at the station house after one has been advised of Miranda rights to be
sufficiently removed from the immediate circumstances of the illegal arrest to
justify its admission at trial.
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violations. Five years later, however, he joined with the Payton
majority in declaring this type of activity unlawful,"z so presumably he would have considered a Payton violation serious enough
to warrant some attention in an attenuation analysis. The current
members of the U.S. Supreme Court, however, had different ideas.
IV.

BROWN TO PAYTON TO HARRIS: A DOUBLE PLAY ON THE
WARRANT REQU]REMENT AND EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A.

Harrisin the New York'Courts
1. The Trial Court

Thirteen judges considered the case of People v. Harris before
it finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 6 The state trial court
found that the routine in-home warrantless arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment. As the trial judge noted in the record, "No
more clear violation of Peyton [sic], in my view, could be established." 127 Accordingly, the trial court suppressed Harris' first
confession as the direct result of the illegal arrest, and the issue
was not raised on appeal. 28 The trial court then conducted a
Brown attenuation analysis on the second confession, and concluded that the confession was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
arrest to be admissible at trial.'2 9 The court did not comment on
the flagrancy of the police misconduct, but did conclude that the
passage of one hour between the arrest and second confession
satisfied the "temporal proximity" prong of the attenuation test.
The court also reasoned that readministration of Miranda warnings
constituted a sufficiently130intervening circumstance to remove the
taint of the illegal arrest.

125. Payton v. New York 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Payton majority consisted of Justices Powell, Stevens, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun (with Blackmun also
writing a separate concurring opinion). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Rehnquist dissented in Payton. Id.
126. In addition to the trial court judge, the case was reviewed by five justices in the
Appellate Division and seven judges on the Court of Appeals. See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
127. Harris 1, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Rosenberger, J., dissent-

ing).
128. Harris I1, 495 U.S. 14, 15 (1990).
129. Harris I, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25 (Asch, J., concurring).
130. /L
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The Appellate Division (HarrisI)

The trial court decision, though affirmed by the Appellate
Division, divided the five Appellate Division justices into three
camps and drew fire from all. Two justices (Sandier and Wallach)
wrote a concurring opinion in which they accepted, with some
reservation, the trial court's finding that police entered Harris'
apartment without consent. 13 ' Therefore, these justices refused to
disturb the conclusion that Harris' arrest constituted a Payton violation which required suppression of the first confession.'32 These
justices also affirmed the decision to admit the second confession
made at the police station, but they did not accept the trial court's
reasoning. In the view of Justices Sandier and Wallach, the Brown
attenuation analysis was "relevant" but "not... clearly determinative." 3 3 Borrowing a page from Justice Powell's Brown concurrence, they concluded that a Payton violation ranked rather low
in the pecking order of Fourth Amendment violations.' 3' According to Justices Sandier and Wallach, because the arrest of Harris
was supported by probable cause, police could have legally arrested
3
him without a warrant just about anywhere except his home. 1
Thus, the warrantless entry into Harris' home to make the arrest
was presumably a technical violation, and application of the attenuation doctrine was inappropriate.131
Justices Asch and Kassal also affirmed the conviction, but took
a wholly different approach in a separate concurring opinion. These
justices would have reversed the trial court's finding of fact on the
issue of consent, and thus would have found as a preliminary
matter that there was no Payton violation. 37 Without a Payton
violation, the arrest would be legal and there would be no Fourth
Amendment question as to the subsequent confessions. Justices
Asch and Kassal also found a Brown attenuation analysis inappropriate. In their view, Brown only stood for the proposition that
Miranda compliance was not dispositive of Fourth Amendment
considerations. 13 In Harris' case, "any 'taint' resulting from an
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 823 (Sandier, J.,concurring).

at
at
at
at

823-24.
823.
823-24.
825 (Asch, J., concurring).
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illegal arrest was removed by the lapse of time between the statements and re-reading of the Miranda warnings." 39 They also distinguished Brown on the facts: the Brown arrest was illegal because
it lacked probable cause, while the Harris arrest was illegal because it was made without a warrant. Although the relevance of
these observations was not given, these justices concluded that the
second confession was admissible. 14°
Finally, Justice Rosenberger wrote a dissenting opinion that
accepted the trial court's finding on the Payton violation and
strongly urged suppression of the second confession. 14 ' According
to Justice Rosenberger, Brown was "instructive ... and ... determinative" of the case. 42 Although the dissenting opinion did little more than quote extensively from Brown, it did identify the
flagrancy of the police conduct by raising the issue of the unique
interplay between the warrant requirement and New York's special
right-to-counsel rules."
3.

The Court of Appeals (HarrisII)

Harris' case generated three more opinions upon reaching New
York's highest court. Although the five-justice majority was split
on the precise reasoning, the Court of Appeals voted 5-2'" to
reverse the Appellate Division and suppress the second confession.145 Writing for the court, Judge Simons found the case to be
rather straightforward. The majority acknowledged that Wong Sun
and Brown had already dealt with the admissibility of confessions
following illegal arrests, and the court simply applied the Brown
three-part test.'4 First, there was an even closer temporal relationship between the arrest and confession in Harristhan there was
in Brown: only one hour had passed between Harris' illegal arrest
and his confession, while in Brown there was a two hour gap.' 47
If two hours was not sufficient attenuation in Brown, then one
hour could not be in Harris.'4

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 825 (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
Id. at 826.
Id. at 827.
Harris II, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 1239 (N.Y. 1988).
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1232-33.
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The court also found that the second prong of the attenuation
analysis was not satisfied. The only legally significant event that
occurred between Harris' illegal arrest and his subsequent confession at the station house was the reading of his Miranda
rights.'4 9 The majority noted that Brown clearly stated that the
administration of Miranda warnings did not dispose of the Fourth
Amendment issue.,"° The court acknowledged that Brown dealt
with a single confession following an illegal arrest, while this case
involved two confessions. However, the court concluded that the
difference was irrelevant: "Having just given a statement in his
apartment which inculpated him in the crime, defendant had already committed himself and 'there was little incentive to withhold
a repetition of it." ' 151
Finally, the court considered the flagrancy of the police conduct. Harris' confession clearly failed this prong of the test. The
court drew "a reasonable inference" from the record that the New
York Police Department routinely violated the warrant requirement
152
in order to avoid restrictions on questioning criminal suspects.
In the view of the court, this case was thus appropriate for application of the exclusionary rule in order to deter Fourth Amendment
violations. And in response to those judges and justices who suggested that the Payton violation was not as serious as an arrest
without probable cause, the court concluded with its own view on
hierarchies of violations:
Finally it should be noted that as a matter of policy,
deterring Payton violations by suppressing confessions
causally related to them is no less important than deterring
investigative detentions or street arrests made on less than
probable cause. All are entitled to the same level of scrutiny and evidence obtained as a result of such misconduct

149. Id. at 1233.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd
457 U.S. 537 (1982)). Johnson, the case quoted by the majority here in Harris II, was
especially revealing: in an almost identical two-confession case, the Johnson court suppressed the second confession with little analysis simply because the first confession had
already been suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds. Because the defendant in Johnson
had already "let the cat out of the bag" during the first confession, the court treated the
second confession as identical to the first for purposes of attenuation. If the first confession must be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds, so must the second. Johnson,
626 F.2d at 759.
152. Harris II, 532 N.E.2d at 1233.
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must be suppressed unless the taint of the illegality has
become sufficiently attenuated."5 3
Concurring separately, Judge Titone rejected the proposition
that a Payton violation was as serious as other illegal arrests, and
he was therefore not as willing as the majority to proceed with an
attenuation analysis following a Payton violation."5 However, he
also acknowledged that a Brown-type analysis was required by
the state constitution, and for
New York common law interpreting 155
this reason he concurred in the result.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judge Bellacosa dissented, finding it
abhorrent to public policy to suppress a confession that the defendant was apparently most willing to provide.'5 6 The dissenters
argued that the familiar Brown attenuation factors were not dispositive, but were merely guideposts to aid in determining whether a
confession was given as the product of an illegal arrest.' 5 Convinced that the evidence of voluntariness in Harris' confession was
sufficient to remove any taint of the Payton violation, these judges
would have ruled the confessions admissible. 5
4. Analysis of the State Court Decisions
Given the clear Fourth Amendment standards articulated by
Payton and Brown, it is somewhat difficult to understand why
thirteen state judges sitting on three courts generated seven different opinions about the case of Bernard Harris. The courts were
confronted with an arbitrary abuse of police power in the worst
traditions of the colonial Writ of Assistance. To claim that the
existence of probable cause in Harris made the Payton violation
less severe is nonsense. Police illegally entered the place most
zealously protected by the Fourth Amendment in order to effect the
most intrusive seizure regulated by the Fourth Amendment, and
they did so without the prior review from the neutral judicial
branch. It would be bad enough if laziness or uncertainty about the
chances of obtaining a warrant motivated police to evade the warrant requirement, but the motives here were even worse: by casually disregarding the Fourth Amendment, police would not have to

153. Id. at 1235.
154. Id. at 1235-36 (Titone, J., concurring).

155. Id. at 1235.
156. Id. at 1236 (Wachtler, CJ., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1238.
158. Id.
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put up with some of the more confining features of the Sixth
Amendment. The people sworn to uphold the law were willing to
break the law so they could avoid offering a suspected lawbreaker
all the protection guaranteed by the law. Even for judges who
indulge in classifying the "seriousness" of Fourth Amendment
violations before applying an attenuation analysis, there simply
does not seem to be any room for argument on the need to deter
the type of illegality associated with the Harris arrest.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that suppression of the
confessions would deter this type of police behavior in the future.
Officers bypassed the warrant requirement solely because they
hoped to elicit a confession by questioning Harris before he had a
chance to speak with an attorney. Even without applying the
Brown attenuation factors, simple common sense dictates that police would have no incentive to bypass the warrant requirement in
the future if any confessions they obtained were excluded from use
at trial. Formal analysis of the case under Brown does not change
the conclusion. As the Court of Appeals majority found, the confessions were obtained close in time to the illegal arrest, there were
no legally significant circumstances during that short intervening
time, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct was manifest.
Some of the judges who considered Harris' arrest and confession argued that the Brown analysis was inapplicable because repeated Miranda warnings purged the atmosphere of any coercion.1 59 But Brown itself unequivocally stated that Miranda
warnings did not automatically resolve the Fourth Amendment
issues. 1" Other judges took a closely related position: Harris obviously had intended to confess before the police even arrived at
his apartment, and his confession was in no way caused by the illegal arrest. 6' This argument is flawed in two ways. First of all,
notwithstanding Harris' calm demeanor as he sipped wine and confessed, the record is far from clear on Harris' predisposition to
confess. He did not answer the door when police first knocked, but
only after police covered both exits and persisted in banging on his
doors and windows. Police claimed Harris voluntarily admitted
them into his apartment, but it is hard to imagine slamming a door
in the face of police officers with drawn weapons when more
159. Harris I, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Asch, J., concurring).
160. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1974).
161. Harris 11, 532 N.E.2d at 1236 (Wachtler, C.J., dissenting); Harris I, 507 N.Y.S.2d
at 824 (Sandier, J., concurring).
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officers with drawn weapons are at the window. Additionally, if
Harris was so determined to confess, he could have kept right on
confessing after he saw an attorney and after his case went to trial.
Certainly, then, the later confessions would be so far attenuated
from the illegal arrest as to be admissible.
More importantly, Harris' predisposition to confess is not the
issue. Brown's analysis of Miranda warnings established that the
only thing proven by a willingness to confess would be that the
confession was not coerced within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment." However, a willingness to confess .would have
absolutely no bearing on the Fourth Amendment issues of whether
the illegal arrest was serious enough to require deterrence, and
whether suppression would deter.
B.

The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion (HarrisIII)

The issues were more focused when Harris reached the U.S.
Supreme Court. On appeal from the state high court, the prosecution no longer challenged the finding of a Payton violation or the
decision to suppress the first confession. The sole issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the second confession should also be
suppressed. 63 Given the state's concession that the arrest was illegal and that suppression of the first confession was an appropriate deterrent, it seems that the status of the second confession
could have been settled with a review of the Brown attenuation
analysis performed by the New York Court of Appeals.
The Court, however, approached the issue differently. Chief
Justice Rehnquist (then Justice Rehnquist) was one of the justices
who thought that Brown was used in too many confession cases. In
Brown, he joined in Justice Powell's concurrence and advocated
that application of the attenuation doctrine be limited to cases
presenting "serious" Fourth Amendment violations."6 Furthermore, it is clear that the Chief Justice did not view "mere" Payton
violations as serious enough to qualify for review under Brown. In
his dissent in Payton, he refused to acknowledge any Fourth
Amendment problems with warrantless in-home arrests. 6 5 In Har162. Brown, 422 U.S. at 600-01.
163. Harris 11, 495 U.S. 14, 16 (1990).
164. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975). See also supra notes 122-24 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Brown concurrence.
165. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 620 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Payton and the arrest
warrant requirement.
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ris he was presented a chance to review Brown and Payton in a
fact pattern that at least superficially suggested a defendant who
was eager to confess.
The Brown dictum and the Payton dissent became the law
when Harris reached the Supreme Court. Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice White, another Payton dissenter, reversed the
state court's suppression of Harris' second statement and held that
Payton was applicable only to evidence seized while police were
actually in the home.1" The Court noted that Harris was subject
to arrest anywhere outside of his home since there was probable
cause."s Therefore, according to the Court, the arrest became legal for Fourth Amendment purposes the moment Harris left the
apartment with the police:
The warrant requirement for an arrest in the home is imposed to protect the home, and anything incriminating the
police gathered from arresting Harris in his home, rather
than elsewhere, has been excluded, as it should have been;
the purpose of the rule has thereby been vindicated.' 6'
At least three things were problematic with the Court's startling
new view of Payton. First of all, the statement that Payton merely
protects the home totally ignored one of the most oft-quoted phrases in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people - and not simply 'areas' - against unreasonable
searches and seizures ... ."169 Second, the majority refused to
acknowledge that unreasonable searches and seizures are regulated
by the Fourth Amendment. To limit Payton only to the illegal
entry into the home, and to ignore the constitutional implications
of the subsequent illegal arrest, is to disregard the clear language
of Payton: "ITihe warrantless arrest of a person is a species of
seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be reasonable."17
Finally, the Court's suggestion that it enforced Payton by suppressing the first confession, while allowing the second to be admitted,
is sophistry: police obviously would not feel hindered from repeating the illegal Harris arrest in the future if they knew that at least
one of the confessions would be admissible. The Harris fact pat-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Harris 111,
495 U.S. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
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tern would provide the blueprint for future police conduct: officers
could obtain the in-home confession while the defendant was still
surprised and disoriented by the illegal entry. Later, they could tell
the defendant they had all the evidence they needed, but just
wished to confirm a few details, and thereby elicit the admissible
confession.
The Court also rejected the suggestion that suppression of the
second confession would provide meaningful deterrence against the
illegal arrest.171 The Court's explanation of this conclusion, when
considered along with the lower court findings of police misconduct, defies logic:
Given that the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect in Harris' position, they need not violate Payton in
order to interrogate the suspect. It is doubtful therefore that
the desire to secure a statement from a criminal suspect
would motivate the police to violate Payton. As a result,
suppressing a station house statement obtained after a
Payton violation will have little effect on the officers'
actions, one way or another." 2
The Court's assertion that police probably would not violate Payton
is simply preposterous given that police in the case before them
did indeed violate Payton. The Court's assertion is even more
amazing because the violation did not result from the actions of
rogue police officers. Instead, the New York Police Department
had institutionalized such illegal behavior into its standard operating procedure.1 73 In the face of these compelling facts, the Court
actually suggested that because police had legal means at their
disposal for questioning or even arresting Harris, suppressing evidence obtained during "legal" questioning would not deter police
from making illegal arrests. One might as well argue that jail terms
would not deter wealthy shoplifters because they had the means to
purchase the stolen goods lawfully.
Turning its attention to Brown, the Court limited the attenuation doctrine in several ways. Invoking the familiar hierarchy of
Fourth Amendment violations from the Brown concurrence, the
majority implicitly limited Brown to arrests unsupported by probable cause.174 The suggestion bandied about by various members
171. Harris'Ilf,495 U.S. at 20.
172. Id. at 20-21.
173. Ld.
at 25 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
174. See id. at 19 (distinguishing Brown because the underlying illegality in Brown was
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of the lower courts thus became the law of the land: a "mere" purposeful violation of the warrant requirement was not worth deterring.
The Court also found a novel way to limit Brown even further.
At one point, the Court suggested that Brown should only be used
where the cause-effect relationship was clearly established between
the underlying illegality and the seized evidence.1 75 It is difficult
to imagine anyone seriously reading Brown in such a fashion.
Brown represented the means for determining the relationship between a Fourth Amendment violation and the subsequent seizure of
evidence. The HarrisIII majority, however, had its own means for
determining the cause-effect relationship in a confession case. A
confession will not be considered the result of an illegal arrest if,
by the time the confession is obtained, the suspect's custody has
become lawful.176 The Court stated that "Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was removed to the station house, given
Miranda warnings, and allowed to talk."' 77 The Court thus
returned to the pre-Brown doctrine that Miranda warnings cure all
Fourth Amendment concerns, a proposition that was explicitly
rejected by a 9-0 vote in Brown.
Four incredulous justices, led by Justice Marshall, dissented in
Harris III, accusing the majority of "analytical sleight-of-hand,
resting on errors in logic, misreadings of our cases, and an apparent blindness to the incentives the Court's ruling creates for know178
ing and intentional violations by the police."
Echoing the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, the
dissent found that Brown required suppression of both of Harris'
confessions: little time had transpired between the illegal arrest and
the confessions, there were no legally significant intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of police misconduct was
extreme. 79 Justice Marshall stressed that the disagreement with
the majority did not stem from a disagreement over how the
Brown factors should be applied to this case: "Instead, the court

an arrest without probable cause, while here the underlying illegality was an arrest without
a warrant).

175. See id.(stating that the Brown attenuation analysis is appropriate only where "the
challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity.").
176. Id. at 18.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 25-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 24-26.
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redrafts our cases in the service of conclusions they straightforwardly and explicitly reject."' 80 The dissent continued with a
point-by-point rejection of the new views of Payton and Brown,
and concluded with the following criticism of the majority's approach to Harris:
The majority's assertion, as though the proposition were
axiomatic, that the effects [of an illegal arrest] must end
when the violation ends is both undefended and indefensible. The Court's
saying it may make it law, but it does not
81
make it true.'
V. DUSTING OFF THE STATE CONSTITUTION: PREVENTING UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIzuREs AFTER HARRIS

Little remains of Payton and Brown after the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Harris II. While warrantless in-home arrests
are still technically illegal, the Court now offers no mechanism for
deterring Payton violations in cases such as Harris. And by implicitly limiting the Brown attenuation analysis only to situations involving arrests without probable cause resulting in confessions
obtained without Miranda warnings, the Court has relegated Brown
to an extremely limited number of easy cases. In close cases, involving an illegal arrest that happens to be supported by probable
cause, where a confession is obtained after proper Miranda warnings, the guiding influences of Brown's three-prong test no longer
operate.
In fairness to the Court, it must be acknowledged that the
Fourth Amendment survived its first 189 years without Payton, and
that Payton itself was decided by a six justice majority over a
vigorous and compelling dissent. It would be unwise for the Court
to overrule Payton: that a judicial officer must determine the sufficiency of probable cause before the government may enter a place
as private as the home in order to forcibly remove the occupant to
a police station seems unremarkable (at least in America). But at
least if the Court had overruled Payton, there could be 'open and
honest debate about the necessity of arrest warrants for in-home
arrests which are supported by probable cause.
Instead, the Court covertly tampered with the fringes of

180. Id. at 26.
181. Id. at 28-29.
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Payton, and almost completely disemboweled Brown in the process.
This is especially tragic because Brown in no way represented
Fourth Amendment activism by a closely divided court. Brown was
a 9-0 decision that responsibly and realistically assessed both the
benefits and costs of the exclusionary rule. Brown gave lower
courts a much-needed method to distinguish among the differing
goals of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when they intersected
in a criminal confession case.
More disturbing is the Court's apparent indifference to flagrant
police misconduct. Even Justice Powell's Brown concurrence
wholeheartedly adopted the attenuation analysis where it could be
shown that police acted egregiously. Similarly, the Leon Court
tempered its limitations on the exclusionary rule with a professed
willingness to employ the rule where deterrence of police misconduct was the likely result. In HarrisIII, the Court went to incredible lengths to justify its refusal to deter the institutionalized disregard for constitutional rights by the police department of the
nation's largest city. One wonders if members of the current majority were being honest in the Brown concurrence and in Leon, or if
in reality the Court has become totally hostile toward the Fourth
Amendment.
At least two states that have reflected on the continued vitality
of the Fourth Amendment in the wake of Harris III have invoked
state constitutional law to fill in the gaps.
A.

The New York Court of Appeals and Harris IV

On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the New York Court
of Appeals once again suppressed Harris' second statement, this
time on state constitutional grounds.182 However, the Court of
Appeals stressed that its decision rested on New York's unique
right-to-counsel rules:
In New York . . . , police are prohibited from questioning
a suspect after an arrest pursuant to a warrant unless counsel is present. They have every reason to violate Payton,
therefore, because doing so enables them to circumvent the
accused's indelible right to counsel .... It is this interplay
between the right to counsel rules established by New York
law and the State's search and seizure provisions which

182. Harris IV, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (N.Y. 1991).
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provides a compelling reason for deviating from the Supreme Court's determination in this case." 3
The state court majority drew the wrath of the dissenting justices
for "rest[ing] its result on a significantly expanded State right to
counsel concept, injected into this case for the first time after all
appeals have been exhausted ... ."' Whatever the merits of
that objection, the Court of Appeals need not have justified its
disagreement with the U.S. Supreme Court on right-to-counsel
grounds. The New York Constitution, in wording identical to the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, guarantees citizens
freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures.'85 The Court
of Appeals could have simply construed its state constitution to
guarantee greater rights to citizens than given by the U.S. Supreme
Court under the federal provisions.
B.

Connecticut's Better Approach

The Appellate Court of Connecticut has also come to recognize
the protective gaps left by Harris IIL. Accordingly, it has wasted
no time in distinguishing its interpretation of its own state constitution from the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
constitution.
In State v. Geisler8 6 a now familiar fact pattern emerged.
Police developed probable cause to arrest the defendant for drunk
driving, but failed to obtain a warrant before entering his home to
make the arrest."8 7 After police transported the defendant to the
station and administered Miranda warnings, he made an inculpatory
statement and produced readings on an intoximeter."8' The trial
court allowed all evidence to be introduced at trial, 89 notwithstanding the Payton violation. The appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial, and the state supreme court refused to hear the

183. Id. at 1055.
184. Id. at 1056 (Bellacosa, J.,dissenting).
185. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
186. 576 A.2d 1283 (Conn. Ct. App. 1990), certification denied, 576 A.2d 547 (Conn.
1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 111 S. CL 663 (1991). On remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Appellate Court of Connecticut reinstated its earlier holding.
State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985 (Conn. CL App. 1991), aff'd, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn.
1992).
187. State v. Geisler, 576 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Conn. Ct. App. 1990).
188. Id. at 1292.
189. State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985, 986 (Conn. Ct. App. 1991), aft'd, 610 A.2d 1225
(Conn. 1992).
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prosecution's appeal."9 However, in the wake of Harris III, the
U.S. Supreme Court vacated Geisler and remanded the case back
to the state court for reconsideration. 19'
On remand, the Connecticut appellate court rejected the reasonmg of the Harris III majority as to the seriousness of the Payton
violation and the deterrent effects of Brown:
By requiring that only evidence acquired inside a home
following a Payton violation be suppressed, the per se rule
m Harris [III] does not grant to Connecticut citizens the
scope of the exclusion that we believe is necessary to deter
police from entering a home without a warrant. This deterrence cannot be achieved if the evidence acquired immediately thereafter outside a home cannot be suppressed under
any circumstances, unless it resulted from illegal government activity "
The Fourth Amendment begins its third century on shaky
ground. Harris III demonstrates the U.S. Supreme Court's dislike
of many Fourth Amendment doctrines and its unwillingness to
openly admit its feelings. Perhaps the pendulum will swing the
other way in time, and perhaps protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures will enjoy new vitality at the federal level. In
the meantime, state courts must be vigilant toward further erosion
of the Fourth Amendment and must be willing to step in with
protective safeguards where necessary
ALAN C. YARCUSKO

190. State v. Getsler, 576 A.2d 547 (Conn. 1990).
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